So you've decided to advocate Condorcet. You will solve the "lesser of two evils" problem, and (hopefully) voters will never again feel pressure to misrepresent which candidate they actually consider the best for the job. This pressure is also called "compromise" incentive, even "favorite betrayal" incentive, and it's a primary thing we want to mitigate when contemplating voting reforms.

But how shall we handle Condorcet cycles? Does advocacy end with the Condorcet criterion alone? Not so! The possible winners in a Condorcet cycle are not all created equal – consider that certain voters displeased with the outcome of the cycle might have been able to compromise with their ranking, to avoid that cycle, and cause a compromise candidate to win outright as the Condorcet winner instead. If that happens, and was preventable, then the promise of Condorcet has not been realized to its maximum potential.

The aim of this webpage is to point out the most obvious, most avoidable mishaps in a given cycle scenario, which are inherent to how Condorcet works and not dependent on the details of any specific method. There isn't always a perfect solution, but many problematic resolutions can be foreseen with the use of this tool.